This paper considers how emotions can foster compliance by rational actors with international environmental law. Many environmental issues are highly emotionally charged. Both supporters and opponents of international environmental law often feel very strongly about their positions and views. A psychological game-theoretic model focuses on the disciplinary role that losing face may play in compliance with international environmental law. This model implies that noncompliance, especially by high-profile international actors, should be highly and swiftly publicized on detection and verification. The model also explains why actors care so much about soft, that is, nonbinding international environmental law, such as international environmental declarations, protocols, or resolutions.
INTRODUCTION
LTERNATIONAL environmental law developed in this century in response to a growing recognition that many environmental issues cross national boundaries and legal systems. Examples include acid rain, 1 biological diversity loss,' common resources, 3 endangered habitats and species protection,' environmental disasters, 5 global climate change, 6 global environmental markets, 7 hazardous waste management,' military activities, 9 ozone depletion, I " and sustainable development. 1 " As with international law generally, international environmental law is based on general principles, customs, treaties, and judicial decisions.12
The field of modem international environmental law has its origins in a dispute between the United States and Canada over air pollution damages in Washington State from an ore smelter in Trail, British Columbia. 3 The resolution of this dispute established the norm of customary international law that it is the state's duty to avoid letting its activities produce harm in other states. Failing that duty, a state is liable to compensate for environmental damages. International environmental law in the 1950s and 1960s proceeded almost exclusively in the form of such customary laws. In the 1970s, treaties began to codify the customary norms of international environmental law. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a proliferation in the magnitude, complexity, and scope of international environmental law treaties. No longer content to merely codify existing norms, these new treaties imposed new duties and standards on states and other actors.
In addition to such hard international environmental law, which is legally binding, there is also soft international environmental law, which is not legally binding. Examples of soft international environmental law include declarations adopted by international conferences 4 or resolutions of international organizations. 5 Frequently, soft international environmental law is expressed in terms of aspirations, goals, hortatory rhetoric, or vague guidelines. The moral and ethical language of much of soft international environmental law 5 Edith Brown Weiss, Environmental Disasters in International Law, 1986 Anuario Juridico Interamerican 141 (1988 .
6 Graciela Chichilnisky & Geoffrey Heal, Global Environmental Risks, 7 J. Econ. Persp. 65 (1993) . " Sustainable Development and International Law (Winfriede Lang ed. 1995) . 12 Stat. I.C.J., art. 38, 1. "3 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Can.), 3 R.I. A.A. 1905 (1941) , reprinted in 35 Am. J. Int 'l L. 684 (1941) .
" For example, the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment or the 1992 U.N. Rio Conference on Environment and Development.
" For example, the World Charter for Nature promulgated by the U.N. General Assembly.
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means that it might play the role of a noisy signal or cheap talk. 6 But international actors, especially states, habitually comply with soft international environmental law. Such compliance may "be due to a mere expectation of compliance expressed by other states and by the general public (including their own citizens) with respect to precepts that a government has helped to negotiate and include in an instrument adopted with the concurrence of its representatives in an international organ."' ' 7 The question of why actors comply with international law applies not only to soft international law but also to hard international law. In fact, most states voluntarily comply with most international law most of the time.
18 Self-help in the form of unilateral economic sanctions is limited by the World Trade Organization overseeing complex quasi-judicial proceedings that determine appropriate retaliatory actions. 9 Using or threatening military force is prohibited except for self-defense in the face of an armed attack.
2
" Collective sanctions are problematic not only because of free-rider possibilities but also because of political and procedural difficulties.
2 " There is no hierarchical judicial system whereby higher courts bind lower ones regarding international environmental law. In particular, there is no doctrine of stare decisis for decisions by the World Court. 22 Finally, one can argue that scientific uncertainty about long-term effects of international environmental risks justifies postponing compliance.
23
Empirical studies on compliance with international law, especially international environmental law, document compliance levels and examine which variables, such as the availability of sanctions or whether a particular law is binding, affect compliance levels. 24 Theoretical explanations of com-6 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations:
A Rational Choice Perspective, in this issue, at S 115. '7 Edith Brown Weiss et al., International Environmental Law and Policy 190 (1998 This paper suggests a complementary theoretical explanation for compliance with law generally and compliance with international environmental law particularly that is based on a psychological game-theoretic model of the "discipline of shame." 8 This model extends unemotional rational choice theory by considering actors that are in part motivated by a desire to avoid losing face in the international community. While the model applies to legal compliance generally, the international community is a more focused and enduring audience than any society at large is for individuals. Disputes over international environmental issues usually have greater emotional salience than other international disputes, such as those in securities or tax, because many people feel that global environmental problems implicate the future of the species and involve moral and ethical choices about how to live in harmony with the planet. For example, in the public service announcement "One Percent Can Make All the Difference in the World," actor and member of the board of Conservation International, Harrison Ford, compares the Earth's most vital biological regions to the human heart and explains the importance of biodiversity conservation to a healthy planet.
29
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses alternative formulations of emotions in rational choice theory and in law. Section III presents a model of emotional preferences to explain how and why not wanting to lose face on the part of states or more precisely their governmental actors and leaders can induce compliance with international environmental law. This model has novel policy implications for monitoring versus enforcement versus publicity. Section IV briefly discusses extensions of the basic model that include heterogeneous preferences and malleable preferences over time. A brief conclusion summarizes the key points in this emotional rational choice approach to international environmental law and considers other approaches to emotions and choice. 
II. RATIONAL CHOICE AND EMOTIONS

A. Rational Choice
Rational choice theory is defined by its two central assumptions, namely, methodological individualism and purposeful action. 3 " The first assumption means that individual decision makers determine, via their interaction, social outcomes. The second assumption means that individual decision makers are rational in the sense of seeking to maximize a complete and transitive preference ordering over outcomes. Rational choice theory is agnostic over what affects an individual decision maker's preferences. Particular preferences can be "selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic."'" Microeconomic theorists originally formulated and developed rational choice models to mathematically analyze the pure theory of individual consumer behavior. Generalizing to decision making over time and in the face of risk led to a theory of investor behavior that is the cornerstone of modem finance.
32 But rational choice theorists have applied this approach to numerous apparently noneconomic or nonmarket settings. 33 Political science has been an active area for the application of rational choice theory. 34 ences. 55 One response is that game-theoretic models analyze such actors as if they had transitive preferences, even though it is known they cannot or do not have such preferences. A second response is that while neither states nor NGOs can or do have such preferences, individuals within states or NGOs do and can have such preferences, whether these individuals are organizational leaders, citizens, consumers, managers, regulators, or shareholders.
There has also been a proliferation of game-theoretic models analyzing legal rules and institutions.
5 6 An often-made criticism of game theory is that
"If]actors such as the personal characteristics of the decision-makers or social values prevailing in their community, which may affect the decision-makers' choices, are exogenous to game theoretical analysis." 57 This paper addresses this criticism, which is related to behavioral criticisms of rational choice theory that find support from insights of cognitive and social psychology."
B. Emotions
One criticism of some rational choice theory is that, " 272, 289 (1996) .
' Aaron Ben-Ze'ev, The Subtlety of Emotions (2000) In particular, the definition of a psychological equilibrium combines the usual Nash equilibrium best-response property in strategies with a fulfilled or rational expectations property in beliefs over those strategies. In this sense, at least one player in a psychological game possesses endogenous preferences. The precise functional form or nature of the dependence of preferences on beliefs about strategic behavior is fixed. But, at least one player in a psychological game has an equilibrium set of preferences because of that dependence and the requirement that equilibrium beliefs correspond to equilibrium behavior.
Psychological emotions involve changes in utilities, which depend on endogenously determined equilibrium beliefs about decisions. Emotions that are independent of players' beliefs about behavior or that depend on incorrect beliefs about behavior can be modeled as exogenous tastes. Emotions that are dependent on players' beliefs over choices are sensitive to equilibrium behavior if such expectations are required to correspond to actual decisions. People obviously feel both types of emotional responses to strategic behavior and outcomes. The category of exogenously given, fixed emotional payoffs does not capture the full spectrum of human emotional responses. After all, the capacity to experience feelings is not uniquely human because nonhuman life feels pain, anger, fear, and rage. But, humans have the additional capacity of self-awareness. Part of that self-awareness includes the ability to formulate beliefs and expectations over the actions chosen by other humans. Another part of that self-awareness involves the possibility of control over the self.
It is the juxtaposition of emotions and the potential for self-control that enables a human being to have a conscience, which can be defined as a selfconscious, psychological activity integrating thinking, feeling, and the willingness to act.'° Psychological game theory enlarges the scope and domain of rationality by introducing beliefs over strategic behavior into utility functions. This allows for the analytical modeling of human conscience in decision making. People with a conscience are willing to do their part but are not willing to be "suckers." After all, humans are not saints, defined as beings that would cooperate or do what is right regardless of what others are expected to or actually do.
Recently, legal academics have suggested that preferences are not exogenous to, but instead can be influenced by, law. One view of criminal law is that it not only may provide deterrence in the form of penalties or fines but also can shape individual preferences. 91 Another prominent legal scholar observed that private individual environmental preferences are contextual and depend endogenously on current environmental law and might be adaptive with respect to existing options and practices as well as past consumption. 
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captures the idea that law can influence preferences if it acts to change people's beliefs about strategic behavior. Law can alter people's beliefs about behavior either by selecting certain behavior as being legal and therefore focal or by expressing disapproval of certain behaviors as being illegal and hopefully stigmatized. The first role that law can play is thus as a coordination device or mechanism, choosing among multiple possible equilibrium outcomes. The second role that law may play is expressive or symbolic, indicating a public condemnation of certain types of behavior.
III.
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Existing models of why actors comply with hard international environmental law focus on third-party intervention or mediation in some international environmental treaties or the self-enforcing nature of some international environmental agreements. 93 This section presents a different model of compliance with international environmental law, soft or hard, that is based on the motivation of not wanting to lose face in the international community. While people can obviously feel such motivations, one might ask whether nations or NGOs or groups have any face to lose. A response is that individual members of such groups can lose face. A related point is that leaders of groups can also lose face. Thus, many commentators have stated that because the world will be watching when the People's Republic of China hosts the Olympics in 2008, the Chinese government may be motivated to engage in a more humane human rights policy. Similarly, many Europeans and Americans are critical of the United States for not ratifying the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to curb greenhouse gas emissions. 94 The question of why people comply with the law in general has been investigated from various perspectives. There is the neoclassical economic model of criminal deterrence put forth by the Nobel laureate Gary Becker. 
S248
regarding taxation. 97 Levi applied that idea to model contingent consent to military service by the citizens of a state. 98 The fundamental insight of quasivoluntary compliance is that for an authority to be effective-whether that authority be a monarch, democratic government, or impersonal set of laws-compliance with that authority cannot ultimately rest solely on enforcement by external sanctions. The threat of punishment, be it a monetary fine or imprisonment or worse, is costly to carry out and becomes costlier as people do not believe they should comply. The looting and rioting in south central Los Angeles that followed the Rodney King trial verdict is a vivid example and reminder that external control mechanisms are often ineffective once individuals believe that authority has lost its legitimacy. Credible threats and the act of punishment itself provide only a partial explanation of why people do not violate laws. As is well known in the law and economics literature, enforcement of laws is costly, and, moreover, there is the problem of who is to enforce the enforcers.
As the Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow once stated, in the final analysis, authority is obeyed when "it is the focus of convergent expectations . . . that others will obey it."
99 Individuals comply because they expect others to also comply. This explains the importance of authority being visible in coordinating the expectations of individuals. In the language of game theory, authority serves to select a focal point from among multiple Nash equilibria. As Arrow pointed out, external symbols of authority function as reminders and signals that others are believed to also respect authority. Indeed, Arrow reminded us that, despite his madness, King Lear was able to see clearly that "a dog's obeyed in office."'" Arrow observed that convergent expectations being the source of authority implies that authority has a fragile nature.
An authority can either be visible to and respected by others-that is, the authority possesses a high degree of legitimacy-or visible to and feared by others-that is, the authority can be illegitimate but has the support of the military or some other coercive force. Contingent consent with a legitimate authority continues as long as the authority is responsible by not abusing its power so others are willing to obey that authority. This view of authority explains why the more legitimate an authority is (perceived to be), the fewer external sanctions are required for compliance, and the less legitimate an authority is (perceived to be), the more external sanctions are required to force compliance. It also makes clear the conditional and delicate nature of authority. The ancient Chinese viewed their emperors as having a mandate Margaret Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (1988) . from heaven to rule that remained in force as long as the rulers acted in harmony with nature and society.
Consider the highly stylized two-player sequential game of compliance depicted in Figure 1 . Player 1 has a choice between maintaining the status quo or adopting some international environmental law in the form of a particular accord, convention, protocol, resolution, or treaty. Player 2 chooses to comply with or violate the international environmental law in question if the first party adopts it. The first actor in this game could be a state, an NGO, an international organ, the United Nations, or a group of states, such as the European Union. In more realistic versions of this basic game, there are multiple actors that move first, including player 2 itself. The second actor in this game might not be a state, an NGO, or some other collection of individuals. It might instead be an elected official, a manager, a political leader, a regulator, or an organizational leader. All that matters is the second actor cares about what other actors think of its behavior. For example, "people may be willing to stop using products that are seen as environmentally harmful (such as cosmetics made from whales or hair spray containing chlorofluorocarbons) because there is social stigma attached to their use. & Org. 179, 190 (1999) .
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player 1 adopts and player 2 violates are N < 0 for player 1 and V -E -L to player 2. Player 1 is thus worse off if player 2 does not comply as compared with the status quo. A standard neoclassical model of compliance would set L equal to 0. In that case, perfect deterrence is achieved if E is chosen, so B -C > V -E. Usually E is further split up into two terms: the probability of enforcement and the magnitude of the fine, penalty, or sanction. Assuming that potential violators are risk neutral, all that matters is E, not its variance. Then, if raising the probability of enforcement is costly, it is cheaper to raise the size of the fine, subject to bankruptcy or boundary constraints. 2 Suppose that L > 0 but is exogenous.
there is perfect deterrence, and it can be achieved with a lower expected penalty than when L = 0. Finally, if B -C = V -E -L, potential violators are just indifferent between complying or not.
But an exogenous L begs the question of where does the loss of face that player 2 feels come from and what determines the magnitude of that loss. Players may vary in their exogenous propensities to experience loss of face on the basis of such demographic variables as their age, culture, ethnicity, gender, and upbringing, as well as other unobservable differences. A desire to avoid the loss of face can be particularly strong among Asian decision makers.
3 It is also unclear whether players feel a loss of face from getting caught for violating the law or for morally disappointing the rest of the international community. The first sort of emotion is an instrumental one, while the second type of emotion is an intrinsic or ethical one. Both types of emotion can be captured in the game by dividing L into two further terms. The first is a term F that is fixed or independent of any player's beliefs about behavior. The second is a term capturing the moral disappointment component of losing face. It captures the letting down the international community aspect of losing face because it depends on the beliefs this player has about the rest of the international community's beliefs concerning this player's behavior.
Let p denote the probability that player 2 complies with the international environmental law. Let q denote player l's expectation of the variable p. In other words, q is the mean of player 1's subjective probability distribution over the variable p. Let r denote player 2's expectation of q. In other words, r is the mean of player 2's subjective probability distribution over the variable q. The variable r is what is known as a second-order expectation, while the variable q is what is known as a first-order expectation."° For the sake of simplicity, assume that the psychological component of losing face depends 
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linearly on r, namely, player 2's expectations of player l's expectations of the probability that player 2 will comply with the international environmental law. In other words, suppose that the psychological component of losing face is Dr, where D is a disappointment factor with D > 0. The linearity assumption is for analytical simplicity. The assumption that player 2's loss of face from violating the international environmental law depends on the size of r captures the idea that losing face includes a psychological component. Thus, the magnitude of the loss in face player 2 experiences from not complying with some international environmental law is provided by L = F + Dr.
In order to fulfill the condition of rational expectations required by the definition of a psychological equilibrium, it must be the case that p = q = r in equilibrium. There are three psychological equilibrium outcomes. The first equilibrium involves player 1 adopting the international environmental law and p = q = r = 1, or player 2 choosing with probability 1 to comply with the international environmental law. The associated payoffs are (P, B -C). A second equilibrium involves player 1 not adopting the international environmental law and p = q = r = 0, or player 2 choosing with probability zero to comply with the international environmental law if it were to be adopted by player 1. The associated payoffs are (0, 0). The third equilibrium has player 1 adopting the international environmental law and p* = q* = r* = (V -E -F + C -B)/D, or player 2 choosing to comply with the international environmental law with probability p*. This third equilibrium exists only if the parameters satisfy the condition 0 < V -E -F + C -B < D."°5 The associated payoffs are (p*P + (1 -p*)N, B -C) . The third and only completely mixed strategy equilibrium is found by setting player 2's payoffs from complying and from violating the international environmental law equal: B -C = V -E -F -Dr and setting p = r.
In the first equilibrium, player 1 adopts the international environmental law, and player 2 complies with it because player 2 expects that the international community expects that player 2 will comply with the international environmental law. If player 2 were to violate the international environmental law, player 2 loses face to such a degree that player 2 would rather comply. In the second equilibrium, player 1 does not adopt the international environmental law, and, had player 1 adopted the international environmental law, player 2 would break the international environmental law because of player 2's expectations that player 1 expects the international environmental law to be broken. In the second equilibrium, breaking the international environmental law causes player 2 to lose face, but only to such a small degree that breaking it dominates compliance with it. In the third equilibrium, player 1 adopts the international environmental law despite the fact that player 2 will break it some proportion of the time because that still makes player 1 "05 These conditions ensure that 0 <p* < 1.
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strictly better off than not adopting the international environmental law. Player 2 is just indifferent between complying with and breaking the international environmental law. The abstract formulation of this compliance game means that it applies generally. Which of the above psychological equilibria obtains depends on the magnitude of the costs and benefits of compliance, both economic and psychological, just as differences in the underlying economics of addressing ozone depletion versus climate change imply differences between the Kyoto Protocol and the Montreal Protocol.
1 " One can think of the above three different equilibrium beliefs as reflecting how strong a moral duty of compliance there is toward this particular international environmental law. Equilibrium 1 occurs when the moral duty of compliance is strongest. Equilibrium 2 occurs if the moral duty of compliance is weakest (namely, nonexistent). Equilibrium 3 occurs if the moral duty of compliance is intermediate in strength. In contrast to a unique equilibrium for a game of compliance without psychological payoffs (when L = 0), the presence of psychological loss of face makes possible multiple equilibrium outcomes, in particular, the first and third equilibrium outcomes. In these two equilibrium outcomes, the corresponding equilibrium expectations and psychological emotional payoffs are what support increased compliance as compared to when L = 0. The lesson of this model is that international environmental law can involve a perceived moral duty of compliance and, in doing so, change endogenously both expectations of potential violators and of the international community about behavior and that behavior itself. Such expectations can become self-enforcing should actors have the sort of preferences described above.
An empirical question is whether international actors have the above sort of belief-dependent preferences. The concept of and concern over face is universal.'°7 A sociological definition of face is "the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken during a particular social contact. Face is an image of self that is delineated in terms of approved social attributes."' 8 There is evidence that a desire to avoid the loss of face motivates countries in the context of international negotiations. For example, during the Military Armistice and Political Talks at Panmunjon, Korea, in 1952 concerning prisoners of war, because China was " [u] nable to accept the 'loss of face,' disturbed by the 'inequality of the US position,' and recognizing the propaganda leverage they possessed given the focus in the United States on the worth of the individual, the Chinese felt compelled to use as many ways as possible to convince the world of the Soc. 867, 881-82 (1976 
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correctness of their position and to persuade the United States to change its policies."'" The language of international environmental law itself often suggests that international environmental law is trying to create such preferences if they do not already exist. Notice that what is important is that not only do actors experience loss of face from breaking international environmental laws but also that loss of face is sufficiently dependent on their expectation about how strong that moral duty of compliance is perceived to be by the international community. In terms of the formal model, the variable q captures the international community's expectations regarding the strength of the moral duty of compliance, and the variable r captures potential violators' expectations of the international community's expectations about the strength of the moral duty of compliance.
This model suggests the importance of a policy of monitoring and publicizing violations of international environmental law. Such an informational policy of disclosing international environmental violations will be more cost effective than expenditures on greater enforcement because of the high costs of greater enforcement compared to disclosing violations. Successful enforcement requires not only detection but also prosecution and the imposition of sanctions that might be costly to impose. A policy of credible publicity requires only detection and verification. Indeed, this model explains why soft international environmental law or law that is not binding and therefore nonenforceable can matter. It explains why actors care about soft international environmental law. It also suggests that a method for player 1 to increase the likelihood of player 2's complying is for player 1 not only to publicize violations but also to publicize that player I expects that player 2 is not going to commit any violations. Player l's making such expectations public may push up the values of r and thus p. This analysis means that pessimistic editorials and speeches by other countries stating that the United States is now going to break all of its international environmental commitments will actually be counterproductive because the United States's expectation of what others expect it will do in terms of international environmental issues is then lowered.
IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL
The above psychological game-theoretic model can be generalized in several directions. First, the model can be modified from one about international actors motivated by a desire to avoid losing face in the international community to one about international actors motivated by a desire to gain the approval of the international community. In other words, instead of subtracting a disappointment term Dr that captures the psychological cost of violating "o Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics  143 (1994). international environmental law from actors' payoffs, actors may add such a positive approval term Ar that captures the psychological benefit of complying with international environmental law. The algebra of the model is invariant with respect to such an alteration of the model.
More interesting, the model can be reinterpreted to analyze the situation in which international actors who do not comply with an international agreement suffer punishments or economic sanctions that are more severe the fewer the parties who are expected to not, and do not, comply with the international agreement. Such a pattern of punishment could occur if detecting and documenting international agreement violations is costly, so a general pattern of expected and actual compliance in the international community implies that violations are more readily uncovered and proved. In Figure 1 , the term Dr can be reinterpreted to capture any punishments or economic sanctions that are more severe when there are fewer expected and actual violations. This is because in the representative agent framework of the model in Section I, fewer expected violations translate into a higher level of q, that is, a higher expectation by the international community that any potential international environmental law violator will comply. A higher level of q implies a higher level of r, that is, a higher expectation by any potential international environmental law violator that the international community expects any potential international environmental law violator to comply. Finally, a higher level of r means a more severe punishment Dr, where D > 0. The rest of the analysis of the model proceeds as before in Section III, and once again, there are parameter configurations under which there are multiple equilibria.
In addition, the model in Section III can be generalized to include actors with heterogeneous preferences. In the basic model, all of the actors have the same psychological preferences. But what if some actors perversely enjoy violating international environmental law and receive greater enjoyment the more they think that the international community expects them to comply with international environmental law? Clearly, highly publicizing the violations of such actors would have precisely the opposite result as in the basic model.
Indeed, the mere adoption of an international environmental law may provoke such actors to behave so as to violate it. An example of a related phenomenon is provided by the recent proliferation of signs in many hotels that ask patrons to help conserve environmental resources by reusing towels and placing on the floor only towels that guests desire to be changed. One colleague's reaction, according to him, is to throw all his room's towels on the floor to spite the hotel for expecting their appeal to his environmental conscience to be successful.
A related phenomenon is provided by the signs in restaurant bathrooms stating that it is not only good hygiene but also the law that employees wash their hands before they return to their jobs. Again, most restaurant employees
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probably do wash their hands before they return to their jobs from habit, because it is the healthy thing to do, or because it is the law. But one can easily imagine some individual who would have washed his hands for the first or second reason but, on seeing the sign, purposely choosing to not do so because of the last reason. Such rebellion at authority might especially be true of adolescent employees.
To the degree that such actors exist, adopting international environmental law and publicizing violations can result in both greater and less compliance on the part of different actors. It is ultimately an empirical question as to how many actors have which type of preferences. How legal and moral incentives interact depends on the answer to such a question. Legal duties might be a complement or substitute for moral ones. In other words, law could supplement or crowd out moral or nonmaterial incentives. The nature of the relationship between legal and moral incentives is complicated and is akin to how values and interests interact in international legalization.
" ' A dynamic extension of the basic model could include the possibility that actors have metapreferences over their preferences. If psychological emotional preferences are malleable over time, then international environmental law might help actors develop the sorts of preferences that result in greater compliance with international environmental laws that actors feel strongly about morally. Thus, soft international environmental law not only might be a prelude to future hard international environmental law but also might foster the development of certain belief-dependent emotional responses. Thus, actors might care about soft international environmental law because it can alter preferences and resulting behavior. The mere adoption of international environmental law may lead some actors to comply with it provided they believe that the international community will perceive violating it to be morally wrong. Of course, for actors to believe that such perceptions will occur in the international community requires that there be some high degree of consensus in the international community regarding the moral or ethical nature of that international environmental law.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a simple psychological game-theoretic model explaining compliance with international environmental law. Actors are motivated by not only financial or material considerations but also emotional and psychological costs and benefits. Actors care about what others think of them. In doing so, the actors in this paper exhibit emotional rational choice. Their emotions are in part responses to being embedded in an inherently social universe, that of the international community. This model predicts greater compliance with those international environmental laws for which there is widespread moral or ethical support in the international community. While several extensions of the basic model were discussed, all of them involve actors having rational expectations about strategic behavior. But actors may not be able to form or learn such rational expectations."' In that case, actors can still behave rationally, just without rational beliefs." 2 Another possibility is that actors have rational beliefs but still do not behave optimally given those beliefs." 3 The approach in this paper focused on how actors can be motivated to act in the present by correctly anticipating emotions in the future. Related but distinct emotions are those that actors experience in the present about past or future decisions. All of us have at one time or another experienced such anticipatory emotions as anxiousness, fear, hope, and suspense. Recent economic research extends the neoclassical model of expected utility to a psychological expected utility model that incorporates anticipatory feelings prior to the resolution of risk."' The authors of that general model investigate the consequences on asset pricing of incorporating a particular anticipatory emotion into portfolio choice, namely, anxiety.' They also discuss the policy implications of anxiety for the Federal Reserve's disclosing information regarding the imminent failure of a large bank." 6 In another model, they ask if, when, and to what extent a doctor should provide medical information to patients who might be averse to such information or might be anxious over being ignorant." 7 Finally, they discuss challenges to learning resulting from anxiety concerns in the context of financial education and genetic testing.' It would be interesting to consider the policy implications of anxiety for international environmental law.
Anticipatory emotions are related to a novel theory about decision making under conditions of risk, namely, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis." 9 This al-temative to cognitive and consequentialist theories also focuses on emotions that decision makers experience leading up to and including the moment of decision making. The theory is based on extensive research in clinical, cognitive, physiological, and social psychology that demonstrates that not only do cognitive assessments of and emotional reactions to risky settings differ but also that such emotional reactions often motivate behavior. The risk-asfeelings hypothesis implies rethinking such core notions of securities regulation as materiality, the reasonable investor, and mandatory disclosure.
12°T
he presence of anticipatory emotions can result in a decision maker's preferences being inconsistent over time.'
21 Such lack of intertemporal consistency might not be surprising.22 But it raises complex normative questions about how to assess individual welfare. For example, how should the possibly different preferences of multiple time slices of individuals be aggregated? A distinct but similar issue arises on realizing that decision makers discount not only the future but also the past.'
23 Such retrospective time inconsistency occurs because of decaying and imperfect memory. Psychological experiments document systematic errors in remembered as opposed to experienced utilities. 24 The impacts of anticipatory emotions on people's views about international environmental issues, as well as how the law can and should address these impacts, must wait for another day. Econ. 375, 381-88 (1997) .
